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Abstract – A simple and general proof is given for the information theoretic (unconditional) security 
of the Kirchhoff-law–Johnson-noise (KLJN) key exchange system under practical conditions. The 
unconditional security for ideal circumstances, which is based on the Second Law of Thermodynamics, 
is found to prevail even under slightly non-ideal conditions. This security level is guaranteed by the 
continuity of functions describing classical physical linear, as well as stable non-linear, systems. Even 
without privacy amplification, Eve’s probability for successful bit-guessing is found to converge 
towards 0.5—i.e., the perfect security level—when ideal conditions are approached. 
 
Introduction. – In today’s normal secure communication, the 
communicating parties A (Alice) and B (Bob) use software 
tools to generate and share encryption keys [1]. An eaves-
dropper (Eve) cannot extract this key because her computa-
tional power is limited, but sufficient computing power—for 
example by using a hypothetical quantum computer or its 
noise-based logic version—would enable her to fully crack 
the key. Computing technology progresses at a high pace, 
which means that today’s software-based security is only 
computationally conditional, and furthermore it does not 
imply future-proof security. Indeed Eve is potentially able to 
crack a recorded key exchange, and thereby imperil the whole 
system for data exchange in the near future, even if such a 
task looks hopeless at the moment.  
The inherent deficiencies in the present communica-
tion systems have led scientists to explore various physical 
phenomena for secure key exchange, so that the laws of phys-
ics would guarantee security [1]. The aim of these endeavors 
is to implement a key exchange scheme wherein either the 
exchange cannot be measured/recorded or, if the information 
is measured/recorded by Eve, the exchange is nil. This situa-
tion is referred to as perfect unconditional security or infor-
mation theoretic security [2]. However, perfect security is 
elusive: one can get ever so close but never reach the goal.  
Therefore scientists working with physics-based se-
cure key exchange systems have developed special security 
devises [3–5], such as statistical distance measures between 
the probability distribution characterizing Eve’s extracted key 
and that of a perfectly secure key of the same length. The 
trace distance in quantum key distribution (QKD) is a good 
example even though its particular use is debated in QKD [3–
5]. The numerical value provided by these security measures 
would be zero for a perfectly secure key. Practically-perfect 
unconditional (or information theoretic) security, which is 
characteristic for QKD, uses measures that exponentially 
converge towards perfect security for increasing key length.  
The impossibility to have a perfectly secure key in a 
physical system has led to the common practice to speak of 
unconditional security (or information theoretic security) with 
an understanding that this is only a practically-perfect uncon-
ditional security, i.e., the maximum that can be reached in a 
physical crypto system. We shall proceed in the same way for 
the rest of this paper. 
It was a commonly accepted assumption for years 
that only QKD would be able to perform unconditionally 
secure key exchange, and that this scheme can provide uncon-
ditional (practically-perfect) security. However this dogma 
was refuted by the Kirchhoff-law–Johnson-noise (KLJN) 
secure key exchange scheme [6] which was introduced in 
2005 [7] and subsequently experimentally demonstrated [8]. 
The KLJN scheme is a statistical/physical competitor to quan-
tum communicators; its security is based on the Second Law 
of Thermodynamics, which implies that the security of the 
ideal scheme against passive (non-invasive listen-
ing/measuring) attacks is as strong as the impossibility to 
build a perpetual motion machine of the second kind. The 
security against active (invasive) attacks is—perhaps surpris-
ingly—provided by the robustness of classical physical quan-
tities, which guarantees that these quantities can be monitored 
continuously without destroying their values (which is totally 
different for the case of quantum physics).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The KLNJ communicator has been studied during 
several years with regard to active (invasive) attacks as well 
as passive attacks associated with non-idealities of the ele-
ments embodied in this system [9]. The scheme was consist-
ently found to be unconditionally secure, with the definition 
above, against each of these attacks.  
The present paper presents a general proof for the 
unconditional security of the KLJN system against any type of 
non-ideality-based attack, even against attacks that are yet 
unknown. The proof is based on the continuity of functions 
describing classical physical linear, and stable non-linear, 
systems. 
 
 
The Kirchhoff-law–Johnson-noise secure key exchange 
system. – Figure 1 outlines the KLJN secure key exchange 
system. For each clock period, i.e., duration of a single bit 
exchange, Alice and Bob connect their randomly chosen 
resistor, RA  and RB , respectively, to the line. These resistors 
are randomly selected from the set R0 ,R1{ } , R0 ≠ R1  , where 
the elements represent the 0 and 1 bit values. The Gaussian 
voltage noise generators—imitating the Fluctuation-
Dissipation Theorem and delivering band-limited white noise 
with publicly agreed bandwidth—represent enhanced thermal 
(Johnson) noise at a publicly agreed effective temperature 
Teff  (typically Teff ≥109K  [9]). Their noises are statistically 
independent from each other and from the noise during the 
former clock period.  
 In the case of secure bit exchange (i.e., the 01 or 10 
situation), the power density spectrum S( f )  and the mean-
square amplitude 
 
Uc
2  of the voltage  Uc (t)  on the wire, and 
the same quantities of the current  Ic (t)  in the wire, are given 
as 
Uc,01/102 = Δf Suc,01/10 ( f ) = 4kTeff R0R1R0 + R1  Δf  ,  (1) 
Ic,01/102 = Δf  Sic,01/10 (t) = 4kTeffR0 + R1 Δf
 ,   (2) 
respectively, where  Δf  is the noise bandwidth; further details 
of the KLJN system are given elsewhere [6,9]. Eve cannot 
distinguish between the 01 and 10 situations by measuring 
mean-square values, because both of them lead to the same 
results as evident from Eqs. (1) and (2), while the 00 and 11 
cases yield distinguishable, and hence insecure, bit arrange-
ments.  
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Schematic of the Kirchhoff-law–Johnson-noise secure 
key exchange system. The various circuit elements are dis-
cussed in the main text. Instantaneous voltage Uc(t) and cur-
rent Ic(t) amplitudes in the wire are measured by Alice and 
Bob and compared via a public authenticated data exchange 
(not shown). R, t and Teff  denote resistance, time and effective 
temperature, respectively 
 
 The only quantity that potentially could give directional 
information is the voltage–current cross-correlation, 
Uc (t) Ic (t)  which gives a directional power flow that is zero 
in thermal equilibrium. Thus the ultimate security of the ideal 
system against passive attacks is provided by the Second Law 
of Thermodynamics implying that, for thermal equilibrium, 
the power P0→1 , by which resistor R0  is heating resistor R1 , is 
equal to the power P1→0  by which R1  is heating R0  [9]. The 
net power flow between Alice and Bob is zero, as can be 
quantitatively derived from the Johnson formula, viz.,  
 
P0→1 =
S0,uc ( f )Δf
R1
= 4kTeff
R0R1
(R0 + R1)
2 Δf ,  (3) 
 
P1→0 =
SH ,uc ( f )Δf
R0
= 4kTeff
R0R1
(R0 + R1)
2 Δf .  (4) 
The equality PH→L = PL→H , inherent in Eqs. (3) and (4), is in 
accordance with the Second Law of Thermodynamics, and a 
violation of this equality would mean going against basic laws 
of physics and allow Eve to use the voltage–current cross-
correlation Uc (t)  Ic (t)  to extract the bit [9]. This security 
proof against passive (listening) attacks holds only for Gauss-
ian noise—which has the property that superposition of 
Gaussian signals remain Gaussian—and its power density 
spectrum provides the maximum achievable information 
about the noise. Thus neither higher-order distribution func-
tions nor other tools, such as higher-order statistics, are able to 
provide additional information. 
 If Eve is tampering with or changing the system via an 
active/invasive intervention—such as launching a man-in-the-
middle attack [9]—the laws of physics are not enough to 
guarantee security. Similarly, non-idealities, which represent 
deviations from the original scheme, pose vulnerabilities. For 
defending the system against attacks of this kind, the instanta-
neous voltage and current amplitudes are measured by Alice 
and Bob, and these quantities are compared via a public au-
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thenticated data channel (see Fig. 1). Note, due to the classical 
physical nature of the scheme, Alice and Bob have a full and 
deterministic model of the system and continuous monitoring 
of the quantities is allowed. Then, based on their comparison 
and publicly set preconditions, Alice and Bob decide to keep 
or discard the bit having compromised security, see below. 
This authentication uses only  log2( M )  secure bits of the 
exchanged ones, where  M  is the number of bits carrying the 
current and voltage data in the public channel, which shows 
that authentication is feasible.  
 
General security proof. – We now provide a general proof 
of the unconditional security of the KLJN key exchange. This 
proof accounts for all non-ideality features, including transi-
ents, non-zero propagation time, non-zero cable resistance 
and capacitance, non-identical temperatures and other inaccu-
racies. The four steps of the proof are as follows: 
 (1) It has been proven that the ideal KLJN system is 
perfectly secure [7-9], which means that Eve’s probability for 
making successful guesses of the exchanged key bit is exactly
 p = 0.5 , just as for guesses generated by throwing an ideal 
random coin. 
 (2) Continuous functions describe the variables of pas-
sive classical physical systems, such as those in the core 
KLJN system (and the same holds true even for analog sys-
tems in the absence of thresholds and positive feedback). The 
function pδ (Q) , describing Eve’s probability to make suc-
cessful guesses for an actual realization of the KLJN system, 
is also continuous. Here  Q  is the set of parameters describing 
the strength of non-ideality, i.e., 
 
Q = x1,x2 ,...,xk{ } , where the 
variables  xi ≥ 0  (i = 1,2,...,k)  in  Q  characterize the non-
ideal features, and  k  is a finite number. The parameter 
0 ≤δ ≤ω  of the function  pδ (Q)  characterizes the strength 
of Eve’s eavesdropping measurement output; in the case of a 
wire resistance attack, for example, δ  is the absolute value of 
the measured difference between the mean-square voltages at 
Alice’s and Bob’s side. The upper limit ω  is enforced by 
Alice and Bob who, due to the classical physical nature of the 
system, also know Eve’s measured δ  and discard bits with 
δ ≥ω . They classify the shared bits with δ >ω  as high-risk 
and discard them. Alice and Bob could potentially reach 
perfect security by choosing ω = 0  at arbitrary  Q , but such a 
choice would imply that virtually all of the bits would be 
discarded. Thus a practical system must use a balanced choice 
of  Q  and ω  for the best security at given speed, fidelity and 
cost. 
 We now show that the perfect security limit can be ap-
proached at arbitrary ω  with a proper design of Q . For the 
sake of simplicity, it is easy to define the quantities in  Q  so 
that their values are zero in a mathematically ideal case and 
 pδ (Q,δ )  is a non-decreasing function of  Q . Such choices, 
for example, can be  
 x1= cable length,  x2 = bandwidth ,   x3= resistivity, 
 x4 = 1/cable-diameter,  x5= specific-parasitic-capacitance  
 x6 = propagation-time/transient-protocol-duration, etc. 
Similarly, it is easy to define δ  so that  pδ (Q)  is a non-
decreasing function of δ .  
 (3) In the case of 
 
Q = 0,0,...,0( ) , the probability 
 pδ (Q) = 0.5  (for arbitrary δ ) represents perfect security. By 
using a Taylor expansion at this point, i.e., in the limit  xi→ 0  
and for all i , one obtains 
 
0.5≤ pδ (Q) = 0.5+
∂pδ Q = (0,...0)⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
∂xi
xi
i=1
k∑
                               ≤ 0.5+ ∂pω Q = (0,...0)⎡⎣ ⎤⎦∂xi
xi
i=1
k∑
 . (5) 
Thus 
 0.5≤ pδ (Q) = 0.5+ qδ (Q) ≤ 0.5+ qω (Q)  ,  (6) 
where  q→ 0  when  xi→ 0  for all  i , and  q→ 0  when δ → 0 . In other words, for a given ω  (ω > 0) and by choos-
ing the variables within  Q  to be non-zero but sufficiently 
small, it is possible to approach the perfect security limit of
 pa (Q) = 0.5 . A similar type of convergence toward perfect 
security holds at a given  Q    (Q > 0)  for ω → 0  (ω > 0) .  
 It should be noted that the above security proof does not 
utilize privacy amplification [10], which can be an additional 
way to go. Because the bit error probability decays exponen-
tially with increasing duration of the bit sharing period, the 
remarkably low bit error probability—such as 10–12 at practi-
cal conditions [11] and the resulting extraordinarily high 
fidelity—allow the use of very high privacy amplification if 
this is required by economical constrains posed by the values 
of  Q  and ω , as further discussed below. 
 For practical situations, performance aspects (such as 
speed and wire cost) determine how large magnitudes of δmax  
and  Q  are feasible and how much privacy amplification [10] 
is required. For example, decreasing δmax  means larger frac-
tion of discarded bits, i.e., slower key exchange speed, while 
decreasing  Q  by increasing cable diameter implies a cable 
cost that grows by the square of this diameter.  
 (4) The above considerations provide a general proof of 
information theoretic (unconditional) security. Below, we 
evaluate the security also by a statistical distance measure, 
namely the total variation distance [12] between the probabil-
ity distribution characterizing Eve’s extracted key and that of 
a perfectly secure key of the same length. We show that this 
quantity characterizing the security of the key exchange de-
cays exponentially for increasing length of the key.  
 In order to assess the security of the shared key, one 
must compare the probability distribution of successfully 
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guessing each possible key sequence of the N-bit-long key 
extracted by Eve, encompassing 2N  different sequences, with 
that of the perfectly secure key having uniform distribution. 
The total variation distance Δ  [12] of the probability distri-
bution characterizing Eve’s extracted key and that of a per-
fectly secure key of the same length is 
Δ E, I( ) = max
j=1,...,2N
P(Ej )− P I j( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ ,  (7) 
where E and I indicate Eve’s extracted key and a perfectly 
secure key, respectively, and P(Ej )  and P I j( )  are the prob-
abilities for correctly guessing the jth version of Eve’s key and 
of the perfectly secure key, respectively. From Eqs. (6) and 
(7) we obtain 
Δ E, I( ) = max
j=1,...,2N
P(Ej )− P I j( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ = 0.5 + qω (Q)[ ]N − 0.5N .  (8) 
For the case of  Nqω (Q) << 0.5 , which is a realizable condi-
tion according to Eqs. (5) and (6), one then gets 
Δ = 0.5 + qω (Q)( )N − 0.5N =
      =0.5N 1+ 2qω (Q)( )N −1⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ ≅ 2Nqω (Q)0.5N  .
  (9) 
It is thus found that the total variation distance between the 
probability distribution characterizing Eve’s extracted key and 
that of a perfectly secure key of the same length decays expo-
nentially towards zero for increasing key length provided the 
condition  qω (Q) << 0.5 / N  holds. This condition is given by 
Eqs. (5) and (6). 
 It should be noted that this security proof is not valid for 
non-ideality-based hacking attacks against system compo-
nents containing active electronics with thresholds, such the 
current/voltage measurement systems at Alice’s and Bob’s 
locations which can be overloaded and saturated by a 
Makarov-type blinding attack via a large voltage spike [1]. 
However, a defense against such attacks is easily accom-
plished by use of proper algorithms that discard the bits when 
the voltage and current are outside their expected ranges, even 
if they are identical at Alice’s and Bob’s sides.  
 
Conclusion. – This paper presents a general proof for the 
unconditional security of the Kirchhoff-law–Johnson-noise 
communicator against any type of non-ideality-based attack, 
even against those that are yet unknown. The proof is based 
on the continuity of functions characterizing classical physical 
linear, as well as stable non-linear, systems. 
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